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Comment: How Should Indirect Evidence
Be Used?
Robert E. Kass
Abstract. Indirect evidence is crucial for successful statistical practice.
Sometimes, however, it is better used informally. Future efforts should
be directed toward understanding better the connection between sta-
tistical methods and scientific problems.
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When Brad Efron speaks about statistical the-
ory and methods we should pay attention. In his
talk, as he prefers to call it, he returns to a theme
that has surfaced in previous ruminations: his un-
ease with the foundations of statistics and his feel-
ing that there is something missing. In this version
he highlights indirect evidence as the aspect of sta-
tistical reasoning in need of the theory he yearns
for.
The framework of statistical decision theory was
created over 50 years ago for small, well-defined prob-
lems. Efron seeks an extension to accommodate large
datasets where individual observations bear an un-
certain relationship to one another. He seems to
think such an extension is possible and important
for the future of the discipline. Perhaps he is right
but, I’m sorry to say, I don’t get it. In trying to
understand the role of indirect evidence I would ex-
amine not theoretical foundations but, instead, the
relationship of statistical methodology to scientific
inference in the context of specific applications.
Efron begins by citing clinical trials as furnish-
ing “direct evidence” about a question of interest.
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It is easy to see what he means, but the stereotyp-
ical problem in a clinical trial is somewhat special
because all the relevant background knowledge has
been focused on producing a simple treatment com-
parison, a comparison that statistical inference will
evaluate in a final declarative step. Clinical trials
are aimed at treatment policy, so decision theory is
highly relevant. In particular, the concepts of type
I and type II error have an unusual immediacy be-
cause decisions about patients must be made across
a large population.
In the scientific applications I am familiar with,
statistical inferences are important, even crucial, but
they constitute intermediate steps in a chain of in-
ferences, and they are relatively crude. As Jeffreys
pointed out long ago, inferences may be based on
estimates and standard errors, and they typically
need to be accurate only to first order. Similarly,
in using the bootstrap we can get by with a fairly
small number of observations from the bootstrap
distribution because simulation uncertainty quickly
becomes smaller than statistical uncertainty. Fur-
thermore, statistical uncertainty is typically smaller
than the unquantified aggregate of the many other
uncertainties in a scientific investigation. I tell my
students in neurobiology that in claiming statisti-
cal significance I get nervous unless the p-value is
much smaller than 0.01, and if some refinement of
an estimate or p-value changes a conclusion, that in-
determinacy itself becomes the story. To be convinc-
ing, the science needs solid statistical results, but in
the end only a qualitative summary is likely to sur-
vive. For instance, in Olson et al. (2000), my first
publication involving analysis of neural data, more
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than a dozen different statistical analyses—some of
them pretty meticulous, involving both bootstrap
and MCMC—were reduced to the main message
that among 84 neurons recorded from the supple-
mentary eye field, “Activity reflecting the direction
of the [eye movement] developed more rapidly fol-
lowing spatial than following pattern cues.” The sta-
tistical details reported in the paper were important
to the process, but not for the formulation of the ba-
sic finding. Such settings seem to me vastly different
than that conceptualized by decision theory. In judg-
ing the role of statistical analysis within the general
scientific enterprise, I prefer Fisher and Jeffreys to
Neyman and Savage.
If science is such a loose and messy process, and
inferences so rough and approximate, where does
all the statistical effort go? In my view, Jeffreys got
it right. State-of-the-art analyses may take months,
but they usually come down to estimates and stan-
dard errors. The biggest news in the early 1990s was
the development, understanding, and propagation
of MCMC, which has had an enormous influence on
statistical practice. The “Bayesian revolution,” how-
ever, in my view, is a misnomer. The most important
method in Bayesian inference is what Fisher called
the method of maximum likelihood. Most of the time
what those people running Markov chains are doing
is, essentially, computing MLEs. The “revolution”
is really a maximum likelihood/Bayesian synthesis
based on EM and Gibbs sampling, and their gen-
eralizations. It has shown the power of the insights
articulated by Fisher and Jeffreys. (With only a bit
of a stretch Dirichlet processes and their relatives
may be included as extensions of the basic ideas.)
What has advanced over the years is the complex-
ity of the problems we are able to attack, not the
fundamental framework.
Data analytic methods comprise both data
manipulation—including estimates and standard
errors—and interpretation. Manipulation involves
the mechanics of statistical inference, interpretation
its logic. If I am reading him correctly, Efron seems
to be concerned primarily with the latter. To ex-
emplify the kind of “difficult new problems” he has
in mind Efron uses a hypothetical issue in apply-
ing FDR to neuroimaging, half-brain versus whole-
brain analysis. When fMRI first hit the scene, al-
most 20 years ago, a statistician told me of psy-
chologists who were doing many thousands of voxel-
wise t-tests simultaneously. The standard method
was to line up the test statistics in ascending order
of magnitude, or descending order of p-value, and to
pick a threshold that gave them suitable results. In
our statistician’s na¨ivety, we shook our heads with
indignation. (I was so much older then . . . .) Then
FDR came along and provided precisely the same
method of data manipulation, but furnished a new
interpretation. And it is a wonderful interpretation,
very helpful. I think we all appreciate it. However,
as its chief accomplishment is to bless the proce-
dure psychologists were already using (but feeling
uncomfortable about, due to problems in controlling
family-wise error rate), it is hardly surprising that
they like it. I am not by any means an expert in neu-
roimaging, let alone in diffusion tensor imaging, but
I am dubious about the scientific importance of half-
brain versus whole brain FDR. I would guess the
bigger issues involve connectivity across voxels and
the hazards of warping brains from different individ-
uals algorithmically so that their voxels are aligned.
I should think a more pressing problem would be
to devise within-subject expressions of uncertainty
about white matter fibers in regions of potential in-
terest, and a method of combining such things across
subjects, within groups. (Apparently initial steps in
getting local DTI uncertainy have been taken by Zhu
et al., 2007, and by Efron’s former student Armin
Schwartzman, 2007, whom he cites.)
In picking on this example I should acknowledge
that everyone who discusses statistical methods per
se abstracts away from details of the scientific
problem—Fisher and Jeffreys did so, too, and it is
unavoidable. I just do not yet understand the logical
difficulty Efron is concerned about. While I certainly
agree that the use of indirect evidence is a major
challenge, especially in dealing with large datasets,
it seems to me that with the passage of time our ex-
isting logical frameworks are treating us remarkably
well. Nor do I see any problem with being Bayesian
in one analysis and frequentist in another, or even
combining the two in a single swoop. The heyday of
decision theory referenced by Efron occurred during
a time that emphasized pure theory in many parts
of academic life. Now we are in a much more util-
itarian period and many of us are content to use
whatever seems best suited for the task in front of
us. As I have argued elsewhere (Kass, 2010), I be-
lieve a straightforward philosophy I have called sta-
tistical pragmatism can incorporate both Bayesian
and frequentist inference.
It is tempting to try to formalize the many as-
pects of direct and indirect evidence that must get
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weighed together, and it is possible to do so
Bayesianly. Like Efron, however, I am wary. In Kass
(1983) I commented on a very nice, but ambitious
paper by DuMouchel and Harris in which they used
a Bayesian hierarchical model to combine evidence
about cancer across species:
The Bayesian approach has its difficulties, for
while it is surely desirable to express [knowl-
edge] explicitly, in particular through models,
it is often difficult to do so accurately. Lurking
beside each analysis are the interrelated dan-
gers of oversimplification, overstated precision,
and neglect of beliefs other than the analyst’s.
Where I may disagree with Efron is that I do not
think it is likely to be fruiful to try some other for-
malization. The problem in such situations is not in-
adequacy of logic, but rather the unclear relevance
of the related evidence. As I said in Kass (1983), I
would not want to apply formal methods in the ab-
sence of pretty solid theoretical or empirical knowl-
edge.
In tackling the complexities of real-life science,
real-life clinical trials, or real-life policy decisions,
statisticians can bring unique insight based on sta-
tistical expertise combined with nontrivial experi-
ence in the substantive area. They then exercise
good sense as they go along. My statistical bioin-
formatics colleague Kathryn Roeder put this well
recently when she told me, “I violate type I error all
the time. And do you know why? I actually want to
find those genes!” As Emery Brown and I empha-
sized in a recent article (Brown and Kass, 2009),
this requires new attitudes about training. It also
requires an altered notion of our relationship to our
collaborators: as Brown and I said, we should put to
rest their characterization (used here by Efron) as
“clients” and, instead, agree to share responsibility
for all aspects of scientific inference—not just statis-
tical ones. In attempting to understand the anatom-
ical basis of dyslexia, of course it matters which
part of the brain we focus on, but the choice can
not be made in terms of abstract statistical argu-
ments. It should result from closely-knit statistical,
neuroimaging, neuroanatomical, and psychological
judgment.
Now, I am pretty confident that Efron will agree
about this. I bring it up because we judge statisti-
cal methods by the two rather different standards of
theoretical performance (evaluated either by math-
ematics or by simulation studies) and apparent ef-
fectiveness in answering an applied question. I find
it impossible to think about either one without con-
sidering the other, and failure on either front serves
to veto further contemplation.
I understand Efron’s “indirect evidence” to in-
clude anything that could, in principle, be used to
help formulate a prior for a Bayesian analysis. My
impulse is to come at indirect evidence from an ap-
plied perspective, and I think an uneasiness much
like Efron’s motivated me in 1990 to begin organiz-
ing the workshop series Case Studies in Bayesian
Statistics. I had the lofty goal of identifying and de-
scribing key steps in using scientific and technolog-
ical knowledge to build good Bayesian models and
priors, so as to help turn the art of Bayesian statis-
tical practice into a science. The idea was to gain
understanding of statistical effectiveness by exam-
ining methods carefully in an applied context, and
I pointed to Mosteller and Wallace (1964) as the
archetype. However, I must admit that while the
workshops have been very successful as meetings,
they never made much progress on the big agenda.
The reason was simply that the audience was too
diverse scientifically, so that speakers could not get
very far into the details of connecting statistics to
science that I originally had in mind. In 2002 Emery
Brown and I began a series of meetings Statistical
Analysis of Neural Data which are broader statisti-
cally but, due to their narrower scientific focus, may
actually be more successful in providing material for
learning about statistical methods.
I have been negative about comprehensive
Bayesian analyses, yet I have spent much time and
effort trying to understand and promote Bayesian
methods. In many circumstances Bayesian methods
are great, and very hard to beat. The nonparametric
regression method BARS, for example (DiMatteo,
Genovese and Kass, 2001), began with existing fre-
quentist and Bayesian results on free-knot splines
and used reversible-jump MCMC to great advan-
tage; it was difficult to code properly and takes a
long time to run on even modestly sized datasets,
but I have not seen another general method pro-
duce smaller mean-squared error and more accurate
coverage probabilities, and I would be surprised to
find an alternative that works much better for the
problem we designed BARS to solve, namely Pois-
son regression with smoothly varying means, which
is suitable for fitting neural firing rate intensity func-
tions. BARS illustrates a general truism: we may ex-
pect Bayes to work well if there is solid knowledge
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about the problem that can lead to useful formaliza-
tion, if one is willing to spend the time it takes to be
careful, and if one has the computing resources to
get the job done. These are big “ifs.” The challenge
of indirect evidence is to figure out when they are
satisfied.
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